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NOTES 
MOVING BEYOND “REASONABLE”: 
CLARIFYING THE FTC’S USE OF ITS 
UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY IN DATA 
SECURITY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
Timothy E. Deal* 
 
Data security breaches, which compromise private consumer 
information, seem to be an ever-increasing threat.  To stem this tide, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has relied upon its authority to enforce 
the prohibition against unfair business practices under section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (“section 5”) to hold companies 
accountable when they fail to employ data security measures that could 
prevent breaches.  Specifically, the FTC brings enforcement actions when it 
finds that companies have failed to implement “reasonable” data security 
measures.  However, companies and scholars argue that the FTC has not 
provided adequate notice of which data security practices it considers 
“reasonable” for the purposes of section 5. 
This Note explains and critically analyzes several existing proposals that 
seek to bring clarity to the FTC’s application of its unfairness authority in 
the data security context and ultimately proposes a novel solution which 
encourages the FTC explicitly to outline its minimum data security 
requirements through nonlegislative rulemaking.  This Note contends that 
the FTC should incorporate a principle of proportionality in any rule to 
ensure that companies know which data security measures they should 
implement based on the relative sensitivity of the consumer data that they 
retain.  Additionally, this Note suggests that the FTC should incorporate a 
safe harbor provision so that compliant companies know that, by following 
the FTC’s guidelines, they will be immune from section 5 enforcement 
actions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the many attention-grabbing stories in the news over the summer 
of 2015, perhaps the most scandalous involved the Ashley Madison data 
security breach.1  Targeting a site known for its focus on facilitating 
extramarital affairs, hackers stole users’ personal information and 
 
 1. See Dino Grandoni, Ashley Madison, a Dating Website, Says Hackers May Have 
Data on Millions, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/ 
technology/hacker-attack-reported-on-ashley-madison-a-dating-service.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/E9VX-VU5X]. 
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threatened to release that information to the public unless the site was shut 
down.2  The hackers ultimately followed through with their threat and 
released 9.7 gigabytes of private information belonging to thirty-seven 
million Ashley Madison users.3 
While somewhat less sensational, another widely publicized data security 
breach occurred over the holiday season of 2013.4  There, over 100 million 
Target shoppers’ personal information, which included credit and debit card 
numbers, was compromised.5  These incidents illustrate the increasing trend 
of high-profile data security breaches.6 
Against this background, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or “the 
Commission”), the U.S. agency tasked with enforcing consumer protection 
laws, has brought claims against companies that have allegedly failed to 
protect consumer privacy.7  The FTC brings these claims under its authority 
to enforce the Federal Trade Commission Act’s (“the FTC Act”) section 5 
(“section 5”), which prohibits “persons, partnerships, or corporations” from 
engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”8 
Within this legal authority, the FTC can bring claims under either or both 
the “unfair” and “deceptive” prongs of section 5.9  Early in its effort to 
bring the FTC Act to bear on companies that failed to protect online 
privacy, the FTC brought claims exclusively under its “deception 
 
 2. See id.  Notably, that information was purported to include the users’ real names and 
any financial transactions they made via Ashley Madison. Id. 
 3. See Daniel Victor, The Ashley Madison Data Dump, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/technology/the-ashley-madison-data-dump-
explained.html [https://perma.cc/W3NL-WD3F].  The released information included Ashley 
Madison users’ names, addresses, and phone numbers, along with the last four digits of their 
credit card numbers. Id. 
 4. See Elizabeth A. Harris, After Data Breach, Target Plans to Issue More Secure 
Chip-and-PIN Cards, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/ 
business/after-data-breach-target-replaces-its-head-of-technology.html [https://perma.cc/2T 
7L-QM7J]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data 
Security:  The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 673 
(2013) (noting that, in 2011 alone, there were “at least 855 data breaches affecting over 174 
million data records . . . across the globe”).  Indeed, even the U.S. government’s Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) suffered a major data breach in 2015, affecting over twenty-
one million people. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 
21.5 Million People, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/ 
office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html [https://perma.cc/4BFV-
BRSQ].  Hackers were able to access and acquire OPM computer records, which contained 
an enormous amount of sensitive personal information, including Social Security numbers 
and fingerprints. Id. 
 7. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).  The 
FTC also has brought general internet privacy-related actions against companies such as 
Google, Facebook, and Twitter. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the 
New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 602 (2014). 
 8. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
 9. See generally A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative 
and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008) [hereinafter Overview of 
FTC Authority], https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https:// 
perma.cc/UH6K-A5X5]. 
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authority.”10  However, in more recent years the FTC has increasingly 
relied on its “unfairness authority” as well.11  For example, in 2012, the 
FTC sued Wyndham Worldwide Corporation (“Wyndham”), a global 
hospitality company, for violating section 5.12  The FTC alleged that 
Wyndham had engaged in both “unfair” and “deceptive” practices, which 
facilitated three data breaches in two years.13  Regarding Wyndham’s 
alleged “unfair” practices, the FTC claimed that it had failed to take 
“reasonable” steps to prevent data breaches.14 
Wyndham argued that the FTC lacks the authority to pursue data security 
claims under the unfairness prong of section 5.15  Although the Third 
Circuit affirmed that the FTC does, in fact, have authority to regulate data 
security in this context,16 the FTC’s criteria for “fairness” remains unclear 
for companies because the FTC has yet to explain what practices it 
considers to be “reasonable.”17  As a result, there are a number of 
conflicting scholarly proposals promoting a data security enforcement 
regime that better informs companies of the FTC’s minimum data security 
requirements.18 
The purpose of this Note is twofold.  First, this Note analyzes the merits 
of these scholarly proposals.  Then, this Note proposes a novel solution to 
this issue that strives to maximize important societal goals:  (1)  the need 
for better notice to regulated entities;19 (2)  the FTC’s goal of robust 
consumer protection;20 and (3)  the FTC’s need for administrative 
flexibility given the dynamic technological environment it regulates.21 
Accordingly, Part I of this Note explores the development of the FTC’s 
section 5 authority.  Next, Part II addresses the application of the FTC’s 
section 5 authority in the online privacy and data security context.  Part III 
 
 10. See, e.g., Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security 
Breach Litigation:  Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 131 
(2008); see also infra Part II.A. 
 11. See Scott, supra note 10, at 134. 
 12. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Files Complaint Against Wyndham 
Hotels for Failure to Protect Consumers’ Personal Information (June 26, 2012), https:// 
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/06/ftc-files-complaint-against-wyndham-
hotels-failure-protect [https://perma.cc/R4X8-PJ6G]. 
 13. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 14. See id. at 241. 
 15. See id. at 240. 
 16. See id. at 259. 
 17. In Wyndham, the Third Circuit held that the FTC provided constitutionally adequate 
fair notice regarding its criteria for fair data security practices. See id.  That does not mean, 
however, that the FTC actually has provided adequate notice. See, e.g., Stegmaier & 
Bartnick, supra note 6, at 706–07 (“Even if the FTC is deemed to have provided legally 
required fair notice of required data-security practices under [s]ection 5, the FTC’s policy 
has not likely been effectively communicated.”). 
 18. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 19. See, e.g., Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 706. 
 20. What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/EX3M-8H93]. 
 21. See Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy:  Defining 
Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 
852 (2011). 
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lays out and assesses several scholarly proposals regarding how the FTC 
can better provide regulated companies with proper notice of what it 
considers to be “reasonable” data security requirements under its unfairness 
authority.  Finally, Part IV proposes a resolution that is geared toward 
balancing adequate notice to companies, consumer protection, and 
administrative flexibility. 
I.  THE FTC AND ITS AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 5:  
AN OVERVIEW 
Today, various companies and other entities store a vast amount of 
personal information electronically.22  According to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), data security breaches occur where there is 
an “unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure, or loss of sensitive 
personal information.”23  A variety of methods can facilitate a data security 
breach, such as theft or loss of equipment, hacking, unintentional disclosure 
of personal information, and use of other inadequate data security 
practices.24  The FTC has identified many inadequate data security practices 
including lack of encryption, failure to implement customary security 
practices, and the use of weak passwords.25  No matter the cause, data 
security breaches can compromise individuals’ personally identifiable 
information26 (PII). 
Although information regarding the consequences of data security 
breaches is limited,27 it is beyond question that they can lead to identity 
theft,28 which constitutes a range of criminal activities and individual 
injuries.29  Criminal activities include the unauthorized use of credit cards 
or the opening of a fraudulent bank account.30  These crimes can result in 
anything from the inconvenience of having to cancel a credit card to 
substantial financial loss.31 
To stem the tide of increasing data security breaches, the FTC has 
stepped in to hold companies accountable where such breaches are 
 
 22. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, DATA BREACHES ARE 
FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL 
EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 1 (2007) (“[M]any different sectors and entities now maintain 
electronic records containing vast amounts of personal information on virtually all American 
consumers.”). 
 23. See id. at 2. 
 24. See Scott, supra note 10, at 144–45. 
 25. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 651–55 (listing twenty-six inadequate data 
security practices gleaned from FTC complaints). 
 26. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 2.  The GAO has defined 
PII as “any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s 
identity . . . such as name, Social Security Number, driver’s license number, and mother’s 
maiden name.” See id. at 2 n.2. 
 27. See id. at 21. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 2. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
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avoidable.32  More specifically, where companies have failed to take 
“reasonable” steps to prevent data breaches and protect consumer data, the 
FTC has brought cases using its statutory authority under section 5 of the 
FTC Act.33 
To establish relevant background, Part I.A provides a brief introduction 
of the FTC’s general authority under section 5.  Then, Part I.B summarizes 
the development of that authority. 
A.  An Overview of the FTC’s Authority Under Section 5 
The FTC is the federal agency tasked with protecting consumers and 
promoting competition.34  When it was initially created in 1914, Congress 
gave the FTC the power to enforce section 5 of the FTC Act, which 
included a prohibition against “unfair methods of competition in 
commerce.”35  Accordingly, for the first two decades of its existence, the 
FTC’s authority was limited to regulating antitrust issues.36 
In 1938, Congress amended section 5 to include “unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in commerce.”37  As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
The amendment added the phrase “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” 
to the section’s original ban on “unfair methods of competition” and thus 
made it clear that Congress, through [section] 5, charged the FTC with 
protecting consumers as well as competitors.  The House Report on the 
amendment summarized congressional thinking:  “[T]his amendment 
makes the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of 
equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured 
by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor.”38 
Thus, Congress has granted authority to the FTC to enforce the prohibition 
against unfair or deceptive practices to better protect consumers.39 
Congress also has granted the FTC enforcement authority under other 
statutes, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act,40 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act,41 and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.42  However, 
 
 32. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 588. 
 33. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
 34. See id.; What We Do, supra note 20. 
 35. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)). 
 36. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 814–15. 
 37. Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 5, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a)). 
 38. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
75-1613, at 3 (1937)).  The organizational structure of the FTC reflects its evolving purpose 
as a joint antitrust and consumer protection agency, as two of its primary departments are the 
Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection. See Bureaus & Offices, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/NLY6-3SAH]. 
 39. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 814–15. 
 40. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 41. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
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discussion of the FTC’s enforcement authority under these statutes is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
B.  Development of the FTC’s Authority Under Section 5 
Since the enactment of section 5, the FTC has sought to flesh out the 
contours of its authority under the deception and unfairness prongs of 
section 5.43  Part I.B.1 provides a brief overview of the development of the 
FTC’s deception authority, and Part I.B.2 discusses the development of the 
FTC’s unfairness authority.  Part I.B.3 describes the FTC’s administrative 
authority under section 5.  Lastly, Part I.B.4 explains the choice that the 
FTC has between adjudication and judicial enforcement when seeking to 
hold companies accountable under section 5. 
1.  Deception Authority 
Section 5 gives the FTC the authority to enforce Congress’s prohibition 
against deceptive business practices.44  However, as Congress did not 
define “deceptive practices” in section 5, the FTC had to develop its own 
definition over time.45 
In 1983, the FTC issued a policy statement identifying those elements 
that it deemed relevant in considering whether a given act or practice was 
deceptive.46  The FTC noted that it would consider a given action deceptive 
“if there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the 
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s 
detriment.”47  Therefore, to show that a defendant has acted with 
“deception” in violation of section 5, the FTC must prove three elements:  
(1)  there was a material representation, omission, or practice; (2)  the 
representation, omission, or practice was likely to mislead consumers; and 
(3)  the consumers were acting reasonably under the circumstances.48 
 
 42. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 
2681 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506). 
 43. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 821–23. 
 44. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
 45. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 821–23. 
 46. See Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174–84 (1984) (appending Letter from 
James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman, 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983)). 
 47. See id. at 176. 
 48. See, e.g., FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 124 F. Supp. 2d 193, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(laying out the established factors that the FTC must show to establish liability under its 
deception authority).  In the context of online privacy, the FTC initially relied on the 
deception prong of its section 5 authority to hold companies accountable for failing to 
deliver on the data security promises laid out in their privacy policies. See discussion infra 
Part II.A.  Although the FTC’s deception authority plays an important role in its data 
security jurisprudence, further discussion is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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2.  Unfairness Authority 
Section 5 also gives the FTC the authority to enforce the prohibition 
against unfair business practices.49  Following the amendment that added 
the prohibition against “unfair and deceptive practices” to section 5,50 the 
FTC spent several decades developing the meaning of “unfair” practices.51  
Over that time, the Supreme Court held that “unfair” practices do not need 
to be enumerated or set in stone and that the concept can be defined fluidly 
over time.52 
In response to a request from the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, the FTC issued a policy statement in 1980 
setting forth its interpretation of “unfair practices.”53  Specifically, the FTC 
explained that an unfairness determination requires consideration of three 
factors:  “(1)  whether the practice injures consumers; (2)  whether it 
violates established public policy; [and] (3)  whether it is unethical or 
unscrupulous.”54 
Despite the enumeration of these three factors, unfairness determinations 
eventually relied primarily upon the policy statement’s “consumer injury” 
prong.55  According to the policy statement, when analyzing this prong, the 
FTC was required to find that consumer injury satisfied three tests:  “[(1)]  
[i]t must be substantial; [(2)]  it must not be outweighed by any 
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice 
produces; and [(3)]  it must be an injury that consumers themselves could 
not reasonably have avoided.”56  Congress subsequently codified these tests 
under section 5.57 
 
 49. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
 50. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 51. The FTC primarily interpreted the meaning of unfair practices by means of agency 
adjudication. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).  
This practice was permissible under Supreme Court case law holding that federal agencies 
have the discretion to promulgate policy via either rulemaking or adjudication. See SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947). 
 52. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931) (discussing “unfairness” in the 
context of competition); see also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 
(1972) (concluding that, under section 5, the FTC has the authority to proscribe unfair 
practices vis-à-vis consumers). 
 53. See Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm’n to Hon. Wendell Ford and Hon. John 
Danforth, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980), appended to Int’l 
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070–72 (1984) [hereinafter FTC Policy Statement on 
Unfairness]; cf. supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing the use of a policy 
statement to clarify the FTC’s deception authority). 
 54. FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra note 53, at 1072. 
 55. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 832. 
 56. FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra note 53, at 1073. 
 57. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see also FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 
F.3d 236, 244 (3d Cir. 2015) (outlining the development of the FTC’s unfairness authority 
and citing the three-part test required for a finding of unfairness under section 5). 
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3.  Administrative Authority Under Section 5 
In addition to granting substantive enforcement authority under section 
5,58 Congress also has given the FTC rulemaking authority.59  Specifically, 
Congress has empowered the FTC to promulgate “interpretive rules and 
general statements of policy with respect to unfair or deceptive practices”60 
and “rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”61  These two statutory grants of rulemaking 
authority demonstrate the distinction between nonlegislative and legislative 
rules.62 
Legislative rules are rules that an agency promulgates pursuant to 
congressionally delegated authority that an agency intends to have the 
binding force of law.63  To justify this binding effect, agencies must issue 
these rules by following strict procedures set forth in the Administrative 
Procedure Act64 (APA), such as providing for a public notice and comment 
period and publishing a proposed rule in the Federal Register.65 
With respect to the FTC’s legislative rulemaking authority under section 
5, it is also required to “provide an opportunity for an informal hearing.”66  
As this and other requisite procedures for the section 5 rulemaking process 
make it rather arduous,67 the FTC has tended to promulgate policy through 
adjudication.68 
Where rules do not follow the strict procedural requirements for 
legislative rules or are not promulgated pursuant to specific statutory 
 
 58. See supra Part I.B.1–2 (discussing the FTC’s authority to enforce Congress’s 
prohibition against deceptive and unfair business practices). 
 59. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a.  Below, this Note proposes that the FTC should use its 
nonlegislative rulemaking authority under section 5 to define “unfair practices” in the data 
security context. See infra Part IV.A. 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A). 
 61. Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B). 
 62. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, 
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 
1321–23 (1992) (describing the distinction between nonlegislative and legislative rules). 
 63. See id. at 1322. 
 64. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012). 
 65. See id. § 553(b). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(1)(C).  The FTC also is required to “publish notice of proposed 
rulemaking” and “allow interested persons to submit written data, views, and arguments.” Id. 
§ 57a(b)(1)(A)–(B).  Additionally, to promulgate a rule, the FTC must find that the “unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices which are the subject of the proposed rulemaking are 
prevalent.” Id. § 57a(b)(3).  Lastly, the FTC is required to follow procedures set out in 5 
U.S.C. § 553, which sets out the procedural requirements for informal rulemaking. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 57a(b)(1).  These procedures include requiring an agency to publish a rule in the Federal 
Register and to allow for a public comment period. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 67. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 692. 
 68. See Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n on Data Security:  Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th 
Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (“[E]ffective 
consumer protection requires that the Commission be able to promulgate these rules in a 
more timely and efficient manner.”).  As noted above, federal agencies have the discretion to 
promulgate policy through either adjudication or rulemaking. See supra note 51. 
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authority, they are termed “nonlegislative.”69  Although they can take on 
many different forms, interpretive rules and policy statements are two 
paradigmatic examples of nonlegislative rules.70  An interpretive rule is an 
agency statement that explains to the public the agency’s interpretation of 
the statutes and rules that it administers.71  By contrast, when an agency 
issues policy statements, it is seeking to notify the public of the manner in 
which it intends to exercise its discretionary power in the future.72  While 
nonlegislative rules afford agencies more flexibility in communicating 
policy to the public, they also tend to receive less deferential treatment in 
court.73 
4.  Enforcement:  The Choice Between 
Adjudication and Judicial Action 
When bringing an action enforcing section 5, the FTC can opt to pursue 
either an administrative adjudication74 or judicial enforcement.75  If it 
chooses the administrative process, the FTC issues a complaint against a 
defendant,76 who then has the option to settle with the FTC by signing a 
consent decree.77  Signing a consent decree is not an admission of 
liability.78  Alternatively, the defendant can choose to contest the FTC’s 
allegations, in which case there will be a hearing before an Administrative 
Law Judge79 (ALJ).  Either party can appeal the ALJ’s decision to the 
Commission itself.80  A defendant can appeal the Commission’s final 
decision to the relevant federal court of appeals.81 
Rather than taking the administrative route when enforcing section 5, the 
FTC also can file a complaint in federal court seeking such remedies as 
temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, or consumer 
 
 69. See Anthony, supra note 62, at 1322–23. 
 70. See id. at 1323. 
 71. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993). 
 72. See id.  For examples of policy statements, see supra notes 46, 53. 
 73. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that 
nonlegislative rules such as interpretive rules and policy statements are not necessarily 
entitled to significant deference from courts where there is no indication that Congress meant 
for the rule to carry the force of law); see also infra Part IV.B. 
 74. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012). 
 75. See id. § 53(a)–(b). 
 76. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.11(a) (2015). 
 77. See id. § 2.31; see also Overview of FTC Authority, supra note 9, at II.A.1.a. 
 78. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (“[A consent decree] may state that the signing thereof is for 
settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by any party that the law has 
been violated as alleged in the complaint.”).  Accordingly, defendants are incentivized to 
settle with the FTC as soon as possible, which, in the data security context, has led to a lack 
of judicial or administrative determinations to provide guidance to companies regarding 
what the FTC deems as “unfair” data security practices. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, 
at 588; infra note 150. 
 79. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.1. 
 80. See id. § 3.52(b)(1).  The Commission generally consists of five presidentially 
nominated commissioners. See Commissioners, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/ 
about-ftc/commissioners (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/QHT8-8DKX]. 
 81. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2012). 
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redress.82  Indeed, even when enforcing administrative decisions, the FTC 
requires the aid of a court.83 
Judicial enforcement has the advantage of enabling the FTC to pursue 
injunctive and monetary relief at the same time.84  However, administrative 
adjudication provides certain procedural advantages such as giving the FTC 
the first opportunity to make findings of fact85 and keeping the first 
appellate step within the Commission.86  Moreover, if an administrative 
decision goes up for judicial review, a reviewing court will likely afford it 
significant deference where it involves an FTC interpretation of a statute.87  
Given these procedural advantages, the FTC typically opts for the 
administrative process, particularly when faced with unique, fact-driven 
cases.88 
Having examined the FTC’s authority under section 5 generally, this 
Note now considers the application of that authority to online privacy and 
data security. 
II.  JUST BE REASONABLE!:  
THE APPLICATION OF THE FTC’S UNFAIRNESS 
AUTHORITY IN THE DATA SECURITY CONTEXT 
Over the past decade and a half, the FTC has been on the forefront of 
online privacy enforcement.89  In that capacity, the Commission has 
brought the section 5 authority discussed in Part I to bear in a new and 
evolving context.  Accordingly, Part II.A explains the development of the 
FTC’s general internet privacy enforcement.  Part II.B discusses how the 
FTC has applied its unfairness authority in the data security context.  
Finally, Part II.C considers recent challenges to the FTC’s use of its 
unfairness authority in the data security context. 
A.  Evolution of the FTC’s Online Privacy Enforcement 
In the early days of the internet, the FTC addressed online privacy 
concerns by encouraging industry self-regulation.90  The rationale at the 
time was that the free market would punish any companies that failed to 
 
 82. See id. § 53(a)–(b). 
 83. See Overview of FTC Authority, supra note 9, at II.A.2 (noting that the FTC must 
receive the aid of a court to obtain consumer redress for violations of administrative orders). 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(b)(1) (2015); supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 87. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(holding that, in certain circumstances, courts should afford significant deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute). 
 88. See Overview of FTC Authority, supra note 9, at II.A.2.  Thus, in the data security 
context, the FTC has primarily proceeded via the administrative process. See Stegmaier & 
Bartnick, supra note 6, at 690. 
 89. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015); 
Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 674. 
 90. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE:  A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1998), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/ 
priv-23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/A77W-AZ2F]; see also Scott, supra note 10, at 130. 
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protect consumer data.91  Thus, the FTC limited its section 5 enforcement in 
the internet privacy context to situations where a company failed to live up 
to the promises it had made in its published privacy policy.92 
This enforcement strategy reflected what is called the “notice-and-choice 
model” of privacy enforcement.93  This model sought to encourage 
companies to develop detailed privacy policies so that consumers would be 
informed as to how companies would use their personal information.94 
As applied in FTC enforcement actions, the notice-and-choice model 
corresponds with the FTC’s deception authority under section 5.95  For 
example, in its first internet privacy enforcement action, the FTC alleged 
that GeoCities, a website that enabled users to organize personal, interest-
based websites in topical “neighborhoods,” had misrepresented its actual 
information collection practices in its published privacy policy.96  The 
FTC’s complaint resulted in a consent order wherein GeoCities agreed to 
implement better privacy practices.97  The FTC continued to use this 
enforcement strategy for several years.98 
Despite its success in early, internet-based section 5 enforcement 
actions,99 the FTC determined that industry self-regulation and its 
enforcement of privacy policies were insufficient to ensure the protection of 
consumer information online and decided to engage in more robust 
enforcement.100  As a result, the FTC began relying more heavily on its 
 
 91. See Scott, supra note 10, at 130. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 815–16.  The model finds its origins in a collection of 
widely accepted principles, which reflect best practices in privacy protection known as the 
Fair Information Practice Principles. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 90, at 
7–11.  The Fair Information Practice Principles consist of “(1)  Notice/Awareness; (2)  
Choice/Consent; (3)  Access/Participation; (4)  Integrity/Security; and (5)  
Enforcement/Redress.” Id. at 7. 
 94. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 2 (2012), https://www. 
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-
consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YJD5-879Y].  Notably, the notice-and-choice model has been criticized for 
incentivizing companies to create very long privacy policies that are hardly understandable 
to most consumers. See id.; see also infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 95. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 812 (arguing that the notice-and-choice model 
corresponds with the FTC’s section 5 deception authority). 
 96. See GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94, 96–98 (1999) (laying out the FTC’s allegations of 
deception); see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC 
Charges of Deceptively Collecting Personal Information in Agency’s First Internet Privacy 
Case (Aug. 13, 1998) [hereinafter GeoCities Press Release], https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/1998/08/internet-site-agrees-settle-ftc-charges-deceptively-collecting 
[https://perma.cc/S8WM-24E4]. 
 97. See GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. at 121–33; see also GeoCities Press Release, supra note 
96 (“GeoCities has agreed to post on its site a clear and prominent Privacy Notice, telling 
consumers what information is being collected and for what purpose, to whom it will be 
disclosed, and how consumers can access and remove the information.”). 
 98. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 835. 
 99. See discussion supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Scott, supra note 10, at 130–31. 
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unfairness authority.101  This adjustment in enforcement strategy signaled a 
new focus on the “harm-based model” of privacy enforcement,102 which 
seeks to protect consumers from specific harms such as economic loss and 
unauthorized intrusion into their private lives.103 
The FTC first exercised its unfairness authority in the online privacy 
context in an enforcement action against ReverseAuction.com.104  There, 
the FTC alleged that ReverseAuction.com, an early eBay competitor, had 
signed into eBay, obtained eBay users’ personal information, and then sent 
those users unsolicited emails misrepresenting that their eBay accounts 
were going to expire.105  The FTC argued that the company’s deeds were 
actionable under section 5 as either a deceptive or unfair business 
practice.106  With regard to unfairness, the FTC, relying on the three-part 
test required for a finding of unfairness under section 5,107 alleged that 
ReverseAuction.com’s business practices were “likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which [was] not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, 
and therefore was . . . an unfair practice.”108 
Although the FTC commissioners approved the resulting consent order, 
the FTC’s reliance on its unfairness authority elicited several dissenting 
opinions.109  FTC Commissioners Thomas Leary and Orson Swindle argued 
that the use of the FTC’s unfairness authority was inappropriate because 
they did not believe the consumer injury was sufficiently substantial.110  
Conversely, FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson argued that the use of 
the FTC’s unfairness authority was appropriate because the consumers had 
indeed suffered a significant injury as their individual “privacy 
expectation[s]” and “consumer confidence” generally were undermined.111  
As demonstrated by the FTC’s increasing use of its unfairness authority in 
 
 101. See id. at 143. 
 102. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 815–16. 
 103. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 94, at 2.  Like the notice-and-choice model, the 
harm-based model has faced criticism. See id. (“[The harm-based model has] been criticized 
for failing to recognize a wider range of privacy-related concerns, including reputational 
harm or the fear of being monitored.”); see also infra notes 211–12.  In contrast to the 
notice-and-choice model, which corresponds to the FTC’s deception authority, see supra 
note 95 and accompanying text, the harm-based model corresponds to the FTC’s unfairness 
authority. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 812. 
 104. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 835–36. 
 105. See Complaint ¶¶ 6–13, FTC v. Reverseauction.com, No. 1:00-CV-00032 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 6, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2000/01/www.ftc_. 
gov-reversecmp.htm [https://perma.cc/RF6G-437L]; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Online Auction Site Settles FTC Privacy Charges (Jan. 6, 2000) [hereinafter 
ReverseAuction.com Press Release], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/ 
2000/01/online-auction-site-settles-ftc-privacy-charges [https://perma.cc/KS4M-KD7C]. 
 106. Complaint, supra note 105, ¶¶ 16–17. 
 107. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 108. Complaint, supra note 105, ¶ 17. 
 109. See ReverseAuction.com Press Release, supra note 105; see also Serwin, supra note 
21, at 836–37. 
 110. See ReverseAuction.com Press Release, supra note 105. 
 111. See id. 
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online privacy and data security-related enforcement actions,112 
Commissioner Thompson’s view won the day.113 
B.  Increasing Use of the FTC’s Unfairness Authority 
in the Data Security Context 
In addition to applying its unfairness authority to online privacy 
generally,114 the FTC also applies this authority in actions against 
companies that have suffered data security breaches.115  As noted above,116 
when the FTC brings actions pursuant to its unfairness authority under 
section 5, it must show that the defendant-company was engaged in an act 
or practice that “cause[d] or [was] likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which [was] not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves 
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers.”117 
In the data security context, the FTC primarily seeks to hold companies 
accountable via administrative action,118 and its complaints frequently 
allege that defendants engaged in “unfair” practices by failing to employ 
“reasonable” or “adequate” data security measures to protect consumer 
data.119  As a result of the FTC’s administrative process, the FTC and a 
defendant-company almost always enter into a consent order wherein the 
defendant agrees to implement improved security practices and submit to 
data security-related oversight for a period of up to twenty years.120 
For example, in BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.,121 the FTC alleged that 
hackers accessed unencrypted consumer data such as bank and credit card 
information as a result of BJ’s Wholesale Club’s (“BJ’s”) inadequate data 
security practices.122  The FTC argued that BJ’s had failed to use 
“reasonable and appropriate” data security measures to protect consumer 
information.123  This failure, according to the complaint, was sufficient to 
enable the FTC to bring an enforcement action against BJ’s relying solely 
upon its unfairness authority.124  Rather than contesting the FTC’s 
allegations, BJ’s immediately entered into a consent agreement with the 
 
 112. See infra Part II.B. 
 113. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 837. 
 114. See discussion supra notes 104–13 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Scott, supra note 10, at 143. 
 116. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see also supra Part I.B.2. 
 118. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).  For a description of this process, see supra notes 77–81 and 
accompanying text. 
 119. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 692–93.  The principal argument against 
the FTC’s strategy in the data security context is that it does not specify which practices are 
“reasonable” or “adequate.” See infra Part III.A.2–3. 
 120. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 690–91. 
 121. 140 F.T.C. 465 (2005). 
 122. See id. at 466–68. 
 123. See id. at 467.  In particular, the complaint alleged that “[a]mong other things,” BJ’s 
had failed to encrypt sensitive consumer information, stored information in such a way that it 
could be accessed easily and anonymously, and failed to use “readily available security 
measures” to identify unauthorized access to consumer data. Id. 
 124. See id. at 468. 
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FTC in which it agreed, among other things, to implement more robust data 
security procedures and submit to biennial third-party data security 
auditing.125  Other FTC data security cases relying on the FTC’s unfairness 
authority generally follow a similar pattern.126  Consequently, companies 
and scholars argue that there is a significant lack of case law or adjudicatory 
guidance regarding what minimum data security measures the FTC requires 
of companies under its unfairness authority.127 
C.  Challenges to the Use of the FTC’s Unfairness Authority 
in the Data Security Context 
In response to the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority in the data 
security context, respondents’ primary challenge is that the Commission’s 
complaints only vaguely terms defendants’ “unfair” practices as 
“unreasonable” or “inadequate.”128  Thus, companies contend that they 
have not been given sufficient notice as to the FTC’s data security 
requirements.129  Two recent examples that illustrate this challenge are 
LabMD, Inc.130 and FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.131 
In LabMD, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against LabMD, a 
company that tests medical samples and reports test results to consumers’ 
healthcare providers.132  By means of its testing procedures, LabMD 
acquires personal consumer data such as names, Social Security numbers, 
and medical information.133  Additionally, the company uses computers to 
transmit information including private consumer data.134  The FTC alleged 
that LabMD “failed to provide reasonable and appropriate security for 
personal information” by, “[a]mong other things,” not having a 
comprehensive information security plan, not implementing commonly 
used security measures, and not training its employees in effective data 
security practices.135  The FTC contended that, as a result of these 
inadequacies, an identify thief in California was found in possession of 
consumer data, such as names and Social Security numbers, illegally 
obtained from LabMD.136 
 
 125. See id. at 469–73. 
 126. See, e.g., Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1449 (2010); DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. 117 
(2006). 
 127. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 588; see also infra Parts II.C, III.A. 
 128. See, e.g., Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 692–93 (noting that, in the data 
security context, the FTC has “use[d] terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘adequate,’ or 
‘proper’” when outlining which practices a defendant-company has failed to use and that 
these “failures ‘taken together’ violate [s]ection 5”). 
 129. See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 130. No. 9357  (F.T.C. Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter [https://perma.cc/3PP7-PN4N]. 
 131. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 132. Complaint at 1, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357 (F.T.C. Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/08/130829labmdpart3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LDS-
8LLQ]. 
 133. See id. at 2. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 3. 
 136. See id. at 5. 
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Rather than capitulating to the FTC’s complaint,137 LabMD filed an 
answer in which it argued that the FTC had failed to give adequate notice as 
to “what data-security practices the Commission believes [s]ection 
5 . . . forbids or requires.”138  In so doing, it became one of the few 
companies to challenge the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority in the data 
security context.139 
Wyndham represents another case in which a company responded to an 
alleged violation of section 5 for failing to implement “reasonable” data 
security practices by arguing that the FTC had not provided adequate notice 
as to what its minimum data security requirements are.140  There, the FTC 
alleged that Wyndham, a global hospitality company, engaged in data 
security practices that, “taken together, unreasonably . . . exposed 
consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and theft.”141  These 
inadequate practices included, for example, the storage of credit card 
information as easily readable text, the failure to use firewalls to secure 
sensitive information, and the failure to use “reasonable measures to detect 
and prevent unauthorized access.”142  The FTC alleged that Wyndham’s 
“unreasonable” data security practices led to three data security breaches in 
a two-year period, each perpetrated by hackers.143 
On interlocutory appeal before the Third Circuit from the district court’s 
denial of its motion to dismiss, Wyndham argued that the FTC had not 
provided constitutionally adequate fair notice that its practices could violate 
section 5.144  In response, the FTC argued that Wyndham had received 
rather robust notice.145  Specifically, the FTC argued that Wyndham 
received notice of the Commission’s data security requirements by means 
of the complaints and consent decrees from other FTC data security 
enforcement actions, which the FTC publishes on its website.146  
Additionally, the FTC contended that many of the inadequate practices that 
 
 137. See discussion supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
 138. Respondent LabMD, Inc.’s Answer and Defenses to Administrative Complaint at 7, 
LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/09/ 
110917labmdanswer.pdf [https://perma.cc/562Z-ADG9]. 
 139. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 610–11.  As of this writing, a disposition on the 
merits is still pending. See LabMD, Inc., in the Matter of, FED. TRADE. COMM’N (Feb. 5, 
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter 
[https://perma.cc/3PP7-PN4N]. 
 140. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 141. Id. (quoting Complaint at ¶ 24, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 
602 (D.N.J. 2014) (No. 13-1887(ES))). 
 142. Id. at 240–41. 
 143. See id. at 241–42. 
 144. See id. at 240.  Wyndham also argued that the FTC lacked the statutory authority 
under the unfairness prong of section 5 to regulate data security. See id.  Regarding this 
issue, the court held that data security practices can fall within the plain meaning of “unfair” 
under section 5 and that congressional action after the enactment of section 5 had not 
preempted that statute’s use in the context of data security. See id. at 248–49. 
 145. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 40–52, Wyndham, 799 F.3d 236 (No. 14-3514), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141105wyndham_3cir_ftcbrief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8U4G-W9S5]. 
 146. See id. at 45–52. 
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Wyndham had in place were addressed in a widely available FTC guide147 
published before Wyndham suffered its first data security breach.148 
The court stated that, where an entity can reasonably foresee that its 
conduct violates a statute, there is constitutionally adequate notice.149  As 
Wyndham had access to publically available FTC complaints filed against 
other companies that had similarly inadequate data security practices and 
FTC statements regarding data security generally, in addition to the fact that 
it had suffered “not one or two, but three” data security breaches, the court 
held that, as applied to Wyndham, there was constitutionally adequate 
notice.150 
In sum, LabMD and Wyndham provide recent examples of overarching 
concerns that the FTC has not provided companies with sufficient guidance 
as to what it considers to be “reasonable” data security practices for 
purposes of section 5 enforcement.151  This Note now turns to consider 
scholarly proposals that have sought to give substance to the FTC’s data 
security requirements, specifically as they relate to enforcement actions 
relying on the FTC’s unfairness authority. 
III.  WAIT, WHAT’S REASONABLE?:  
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE FTC’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE 
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF WHAT IT DEEMS TO BE 
UNFAIR DATA SECURITY PRACTICES 
In light of the FTC’s arguably vague complaints and the relative lack of 
case law or other guidance regarding what constitutes sufficient data 
security measures under the FTC’s unfairness authority, there is a sense in 
the legal community that the FTC has not provided sufficient guidance to 
companies regarding what “reasonable” or “adequate” data security 
measures they should implement.152  This part considers and provides a 
critical analysis of proposals to promote a data security enforcement regime 
 
 147. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION:  A GUIDE 
FOR BUSINESS (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus69-
protecting-personal-information-guide-business_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/39X8-ZZ5Q].  A 
version of this guide was available in 2007. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 145, 
at 49. 
 148. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 145, at 49–52. 
 149. See Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 256. 
 150. See id. at 256–59.  Despite the Third Circuit’s holding that Wyndham received fair 
notice, this Note argues that, even if the FTC has given constitutionally adequate notice, as a 
policy matter it still has not given sufficient notice to regulated entities regarding its 
minimum data security requirements. See infra Part IV.A.  In December 2015, Wyndham 
settled with the FTC. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Wyndham Settles FTC 
Charges It Unfairly Placed Consumers’ Payment Card Information at Risk (Dec. 9, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-it-
unfairly-placed-consumers-payment [https://perma.cc/C9UK-VZ2L]; see also supra note 78. 
 151. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 152. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 10, at 143–44; Serwin, supra note 21, at 812–13; 
Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 676. But see Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 589 
(arguing that the FTC’s enforcement actions essentially have created a new area of privacy 
common law). 
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that better informs companies of those data security practices that the FTC 
deems “unfair.” 
A.  Proposed Solutions 
At present, there are multiple perspectives on this issue, which this Note 
broadly characterizes as:  (1)  the ad hoc approach; (2)  the legislative fix; 
(3)  the administrative fix; and (4)  a proposal for a new privacy framework.  
Each of these is discussed in turn.153 
1.  The Ad Hoc Approach 
With respect to notifying companies of its data security requirements, the 
FTC has, until now, engaged in an essentially ad hoc, enforcement-based 
approach.154  Relying upon adjudication to advance its data security 
policy,155 the FTC publishes complaints and consent orders from 
enforcement actions regarding inadequate data security practices on its 
website.156  The Commission contends that, by providing companies with 
documents from past data security enforcement actions listing specific 
practices that violate section 5, it adequately notifies those companies of its 
evolving data security requirements.157  Additionally, the FTC notes that it 
publishes various online guidance brochures discussing data security best 
practices.158  The FTC also has begun hosting live “Start with Security” 
events, which enable the FTC “to provide companies with practical tips and 
strategies for implementing effective data security.”159 
 
 153. Scholars have noted that there is a “dearth of scholarship” in this area. Solove & 
Hartzog, supra note 7, at 588.  Therefore, there is not an extensive body of literature for this 
Note to review.  Nevertheless, the relative scholarly silence regarding such a pressing 
societal issue serves to underscore the importance of this Note’s thesis. 
 154. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 692. 
 155. Under SEC v. Chenery Corp., the FTC can opt to promulgate policy via 
adjudication. See supra notes 51, 68. 
 156. See, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., in the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 23, 
2005), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/042-3160/bjs-wholesale-club-
inc-matter [https://perma.cc/68FD-9DWM]; Dave & Buster’s, Inc., in the Matter of, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (June 8, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/082-
3153/dave-busters-incin-matter [https://perma.cc/X645-J3P2]; TJX Companies, the, Inc., in 
the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 1, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/072-3055/tjx-companies-inc-matter [https://perma.cc/2WZN-TCWY]. 
 157. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 145, at 45–49. 
 158. See, e.g., id. at 49–52.  For examples of such guidance, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
supra note 147; FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY:  A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 
(2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwith 
security.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8JT-SRRW].  The FTC also has a webpage dedicated to data 
security. See Data Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/privacy-and-security/data-security (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (providing links to 
videos and other FTC webpages with data security-related guidance) [https://perma.cc/ 
HBX7-GZ8X]. 
 159. Start with Security—Austin, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/events-calendar/2015/11/start-security-austin (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (describing 
one such event in Austin, Texas) [https://perma.cc/3WQ5-A4ZT]. 
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Professors Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog argue that the FTC’s 
current practice is on the right track.160  While discussing the FTC’s role in 
privacy enforcement generally, they have argued that the FTC has 
essentially developed a body of privacy “common law” through their 
various complaints, consent orders, and guidance materials, which, when 
considered as a whole, constitute a robust body of online privacy and data 
security jurisprudence.161 
More specifically, Solove and Hartzog contend that the FTC’s many data 
security complaints and consent orders are the functional equivalent of 
judicial common law, not only because the orders are published on the 
FTC’s website and the Commission typically follows a given order in 
subsequent enforcement actions, but also because lawyers look to these 
documents when advising corporate clients on data security matters.162  
Additionally, the authors liken other materials published by the FTC 
regarding its data security requirements—such as press releases and online 
guidance163—to dicta in judicial opinions, as they, too, provide some sense 
of what the FTC requires of companies in terms of minimum data security 
requirements.164 
Solove and Hartzog go on to argue that the FTC has developed 
overarching principles within its privacy and data security 
“jurisprudence.”165  For instance, mimicking the incremental development 
of common law,166 the FTC has begun requiring through its data security 
enforcement actions that companies follow ever more specific data security 
standards.167  In response to the argument that the FTC does not adequately 
notify companies of its minimum data security requirements, the authors 
provide a list of twenty-five “standards” identified in data security-related 
complaints and consent orders.168  Thus, according to the authors, the 
FTC’s data security jurisprudence provides ample notice of its data security 
expectations.169 
In addition, Solove and Hartzog argue that the FTC’s data security 
jurisprudence has provided companies with a “baseline” to follow.170  
Drawing from established industry norms and resulting consumer 
 
 160. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 589.  Although the article addresses the 
FTC’s involvement in privacy enforcement generally, the authors do spend considerable 
time discussing the FTC’s data security jurisprudence. See id. at 650–55 (explaining the 
specific data security practices that the FTC has identified by means of data security 
enforcement cases). 
 161. See id. at 585–86. 
 162. See id. at 621–22. 
 163. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text. 
 164. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 626. 
 165. See id. at 627.  With regard to the FTC’s data security jurisprudence under its 
unfairness authority, Solove and Hartzog’s discussion is limited to the most general of terms. 
See id. at 643 (“[T]he FTC deem[s] . . . defendants’ lack of adequate security measures to be 
an unfair practice.”). 
 166. See id. at 648. 
 167. See id. at 590. 
 168. See id. at 650–55. 
 169. See id. at 650–51. 
 170. See id. at 661. 
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expectations, the authors suggest that the FTC has demanded “adequate 
data security” as a requirement to avoid liability under the unfairness prong 
of section 5.171 
In light of the FTC’s growing privacy and data security jurisprudence, 
Solove and Hartzog call upon the FTC to continue drawing from industry 
norms, as well as the consumer expectations those norms created, to give 
ever more substance to its requirement that companies employ “reasonable” 
data security measures.172  Moreover, they suggest that the FTC should be 
emboldened to continue enforcing data security breaches under the 
unfairness authority of section 5.173 
2.  The Legislative Fix 
In contrast to those who believe that the FTC’s current practice is best, at 
least one scholar would rely on Congress to provide a direct statutory grant 
of authority to the FTC to enforce unfair data security practices.174  For 
example, Professor Michael D. Scott has maintained that, because the FTC 
has neither provided for hearings or public comment nor promulgated 
legislative or nonlegislative rules, companies have received no real 
guidance as to which data security practices the FTC deems to be unfair.175  
Indeed, Scott has gone further by suggesting that the FTC may be 
exceeding its statutory authority by bringing its unfairness authority to bear 
on companies that suffer data security breaches.176  By applying the three-
pronged test required for a finding of unfairness under section 5177 to extant 
FTC data security cases, he has sought to show that allegations of 
unfairness against companies that suffered data security breaches do not 
pass statutory muster.178 
As to substantial injury, Scott notes that FTC data security cases relying 
on an unfairness theory contain no allegations of substantial monetary 
loss.179  The FTC argues that consumers are substantially injured to the 
extent that they are inconvenienced by having to deal with identity theft and 
that there is significant monetary injury when the total amount of fraudulent 
 
 171. Id. at 661–62. 
 172. See id. at 673. 
 173. See id. at 676.  The article concludes by suggesting that there is more room for the 
FTC’s data security jurisprudence to be fleshed out. See id. (“This Article is hopefully the 
start of a more sustained examination of the FTC, the body of [privacy] law it has developed, 
and the future directions that law can take.”).  This Note intends to be a step in that direction. 
 174. See Scott, supra note 10, at 183. 
 175. See id. at 143–44. 
 176. See id. at 129.  Professor Scott’s article was written before the Third Circuit held that 
inadequate data security practices could lead to a finding of unfairness for the purposes of 
section 5. See supra note 144. 
 177. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.  For reference, the FTC must show 
that consumer injury was:  (1)  substantial; (2)  not outweighed by any countervailing 
benefits to consumers or competition; and (3)  an injury that consumers themselves could not 
reasonably have avoided. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
 178. See Scott, supra note 10, at 151–65. 
 179. See id. at 153. 
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purchases made by identity thieves is aggregated.180  Scott maintains, 
however, that these are not actionable injuries under section 5 because there 
is no showing of an actual, specific, monetary loss to consumers.181 
Looking to the next prong of the three-part test for a finding of 
unfairness, Scott notes that companies must strike a balance between having 
no data security, which is certainly unreasonable, and perfect security, 
which is unachievable.182  However, as the FTC has not provided for 
hearings or public comment regarding unfair data security practices, he 
explains that there is no way for companies realistically to strike that 
balance.183  Thus, Scott concludes, the FTC cannot accurately determine 
whether injuries are outweighed by benefits to competition or consumers.184 
Lastly, Scott considers consumers’ ability to avoid being exposed to a 
data security breach.185  As it would be patently unreasonable to require 
that consumers refrain from things such as using credit cards, Scott 
determines that the third prong required for a finding of unfairness would 
weigh in the FTC’s favor.186 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Scott suggests that the FTC has 
exceeded its statutory authority under section 5 by bringing unfairness cases 
against companies who have suffered data security breaches.187  
Accordingly, he proposes an overarching legislative fix that would 
explicitly direct the FTC to regulate corporate data security.188 
With respect to specifics, in addition to granting the FTC jurisdiction 
over data security under section 5, Scott’s proposed legislation would 
require the FTC to promulgate legislative rules directing companies to 
implement “policies and procedures regarding information security 
practices.”189  Notably, this rulemaking authority would lack the additional 
procedural burdens currently in place under section 5.190  Finally, the 
proposed statute would explicitly state that the FTC’s enforcement authority 
 
 180. See id. at 157. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. at 160. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. at 161–62. 
 186. See id.  Scott also argues that the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority against 
companies that have suffered data security breaches is questionable at best because there is 
no “clearly established” public policy regarding data security breaches. See id. at 162–65. 
 187. See id. at 183.  As a result, according to Scott, a company subject to data security 
breaches must now chose either to avoid competing in sectors where consumer data could be 
compromised or overinvest in new technology to ensure compliance with the FTC’s 
requirements. See id. at 171. 
 188. See generally id. at 177–82.  For his proposal, Scott draws on other statutes that give 
the FTC industry-specific jurisdiction over certain data security breaches. See id. at 172. 
 189. Id. at 178.  Under Scott’s proposal, the FTC will explicitly look to “generally 
accepted national and international information security standards” to give substance to its 
requirements. Id. at 179. 
 190. See id. at 178 (requiring that the FTC follow 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) when 
promulgating rules under the proposed statute); see also supra notes 66–67 and 
accompanying text (discussing the procedural burdens currently in place under section 5). 
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vis-à-vis data security breaches is derived from section 5 itself.191  
Ultimately, Scott’s goal is to ensure that companies know what the FTC 
considers to be unfair data security practices so that they can implement 
proper security measures to adequately protect consumer data.192 
3.  The Administrative Fix 
Also in opposition to the FTC’s current practices, others contend that the 
FTC should exercise its administrative authority by promulgating 
regulations that detail what it expects of companies in terms of data security 
practices.193  Put another way, these scholars would have the FTC issue 
data security guidance via legislative or nonlegislative rulemaking.194  Two 
attorneys who specialize in information privacy practice, Gerard Stegmaier 
and Wendell Bartnick, have offered such a proposal.195 
Much like Professor Scott, Stegmaier and Bartnick argue that the FTC 
has provided little ascertainable guidance to companies regarding which 
data security practices it considers unfair.196  The authors explain that the 
FTC has contented itself with providing notice to companies via its 
published complaints and consent decrees and its online data security 
reports.197  This general practice, to the authors, is not enough to provide 
adequate notice198 because it does nothing more than explain that certain 
“unreasonable” practices “taken together” add up to liability under the 
FTC’s unfairness authority.199 
In response to the FTC’s current practice, Stegmaier and Bartnick 
suggest that the FTC ought to engage in legislative rulemaking that 
 
 191. See Scott, supra note 10, at 180.  In addition to making the FTC’s data security 
enforcement authority explicit, Scott notes that his statute would provide the added benefit of 
allowing for public input during the rulemaking process. See id. at 183. 
 192. See id.  As of this writing, there is data security legislation pending before the 
Senate. See Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, S. 177, 114th Cong. (2015).  
This bill grants the FTC specific authority to regulate data security breaches under section 5. 
See id. § 5(c)(1).  However, the bill appears to grant the FTC the same rulemaking authority 
that is has under section 5. See id. § 5(c)(2).  In other words, the FTC would be subject to the 
same onerous rulemaking procedures as it is under section 5 already. See supra note 66 and 
accompanying text. 
 193. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 720. 
 194. See id.; see also supra Part I.B.3. 
 195. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 720.  The authors suggest that the FTC 
has not provided constitutionally adequate notice to companies of which data security 
practices it considers to be unfair. See id. at 706.  It bears repeating that, after they published 
their article, the Third Circuit held that, at least as applied, the FTC has adequately provided 
companies with such notice. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 256–59 
(3d Cir. 2015); see also supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 196. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 695. 
 197. See id. at 691–94.  The authors do note that, under SEC v. Chenery Corp., the FTC 
has the discretion to choose to promulgate policy via adjudication rather than rulemaking. 
See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 691. 
 198. See id. at 695.  Indeed, Stegmaier and Bartnick maintain that “[e]ven if the FTC has 
provided enough notice to meet constitutional requirements, . . . its current efforts are 
inadequate.” Id. at 676. 
 199. See id. at 691–93. 
2016] FTC’s UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY AND DATA SECURITY 2249 
explicitly lays out what it considers to be unfair data security practices.200  
First, the authors note that the FTC already has successfully engaged in data 
security-based legislative rulemaking under certain industry-specific 
statutes which grant the FTC express authority to enforce data security 
breaches.201  Given these successes, Stegmaier and Bartnick argue that the 
legislative rulemaking process under section 5 itself would be beneficial 
because it would provide notice to regulated companies via the required 
notice-and-comment period and allow companies to provide input toward 
any proposed rule.202  Additionally, the authors claim that specific guidance 
as to the FTC’s minimum data security requirements provided in a 
legislative rule would prevent companies from overinvesting in unnecessary 
data security measures in an effort to avoid liability.203  With respect to the 
onerous procedural requirements for legislative rulemaking under section 
5,204 Stegmaier and Bartnick maintain that the costs of the rulemaking 
process will be outweighed by the savings derived from increased industry 
compliance, which would be spurred by clearer, more ascertainable data 
security requirements.205  Aside from legislative rulemaking, Stegmaier and 
Bartnick also suggest that nonlegislative rules, in whichever form, that 
more specifically outline what the FTC considers to be unfair data security 
practices, may also serve to provide improved notice to companies as 
against the FTC’s current practices.206 
Stegmaier and Bartnick recommend that any rule, legislative or 
nonlegislative, that the FTC promulgates must be more specific than the 
FTC’s current reasonableness requirement.207  To these authors, adequate 
notice requires more practical requirements that help companies understand 
what data security practices would be considered “unfair” for the purposes 
of section 5.208 
4.  A Proposal for a New Privacy Framework 
Lastly, Andrew Serwin, an attorney who practices in the areas of privacy 
and cybersecurity, has proposed an entirely new framework for privacy 
 
 200. See id. at 707.  Stegmaier and Bartnick also suggest that the FTC, in lieu of or in 
addition to legislative rulemaking, should continue to engage in formal adjudication and 
litigation. See id. at 714–15.  According to the authors, these processes would provide 
greater notice to regulated companies than the FTC’s current practices because they would 
receive, in the case of formal adjudication, more specific FTC findings of facts and, in the 
case of litigation, judicial decisions on the merits regarding violations of section 5. See id. 
 201. See id. at 708. 
 202. See id. at 710–11. 
 203. See id.; see also supra note 187. 
 204. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 712.  Moreover, the authors contend that 
the FTC will see additional savings in investigation and litigation costs because clearer data 
security rules would make it easier for the Commission to identify and enforce unfair data 
security practices. See id. 
 206. See id. at 715–17. 
 207. See id. at 717–20; see also supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
 208. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 717. 
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enforcement in the United States.209  In his article, he notes that the notice-
and-choice210 and the harm-based models211 have failed to engender 
effective enforcement.212  He then goes on to discuss three distinct “models 
for privacy,”213 which include the accountability model,214 processing 
limitations model,215 and proportionality model.216 
Serwin defines the accountability model of privacy as a regime in which 
companies are held accountable for how they handle consumer data.217  In 
his view, this model relies heavily upon reactive and involuntary privacy 
enforcement.218  While he deems enforcement to be an important part of 
any privacy regime, Serwin does not consider it to be the appropriate focal 
point because any regime based primarily upon enforcement leaves 
regulated entities without any meaningful ex ante guidance.219 
Serwin next considers the processing limitations model, which he 
explains has its focus on restricting the use of information.220  As with the 
accountability model, he maintains that this model, while important, cannot 
be the focus of a privacy regime because any restrictions on data usage 
should be based on an ascertainable governing principle.221 
Lastly, to provide privacy regulation with a governing principle, Serwin 
discusses a proportionality-based privacy model,222 which relies on the 
premise that privacy safeguards should be related to the sensitivity of the 
data they are meant to protect.223  Under this regime, Serwin would propose 
a four-tiered framework—ranging from “nonsensitive” to “highly 
sensitive”—that would categorize specific types of data by sensitivity.224  
Thus, Serwin’s proposal would define how sensitive a given type of 
consumer information is and attach to that categorization an attendant set of 
security requirements based upon industry best practices.225  This approach, 
Serwin argues, would govern both the limitations on the use of data and the 
 
 209. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 812–13. 
 210. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 842–44.  Serwin also notes that the FTC itself has 
recognized that these models have been somewhat ineffective. See id. at 843. 
 213. See id. at 844. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. at 848. 
 216. See id. at 849. 
 217. See id. at 846. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id. at 848 (“[A]n accountability-centric model would be like passing 
comprehensive privacy legislation and simply saying, ‘If you violate someone’s privacy you 
will be liable for a $10,000 fine,’ without defining what data is covered or what acts are 
prohibited.”). 
 220. See id. 
 221. See id. at 849 (“[A process limitations-centric model] would be like passing 
legislation that provides restrictions on the use of data without defining data in the first 
place.”). 
 222. See id. 
 223. See id. at 852. 
 224. See id. at 850. 
 225. See id. at 851. 
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appropriate means of enforcement based upon the sensitivity of the data in 
question.226 
Serwin goes on to outline a number of benefits to a proportionality-based 
privacy model.227  For example, he notes that a preexisting tier system 
would serve to protect consumer information ex ante by enabling 
companies to use data security practices to prevent breaches rather than 
relying on ex post enforcement.228  Additionally, Serwin explains that his 
proposed framework would provide administrative flexibility as any given 
type of information could be moved between tiers.229  Serwin also contends 
that this regime would help provide guidance to companies so that they 
could know, at the outset, where a given dataset falls on the sensitivity 
continuum.230 
With respect to implementation, Serwin expresses ambivalence as 
between administrative rulemaking and legislation.231  In either case, he 
would encourage the development of a new regime wherein the FTC would 
administer a voluntary, proportionality-based program that would seek to 
encourage companies to implement best practices.232  Compliance with this 
regime would provide a safe harbor, immunizing compliant companies 
from enforcement actions.233 
B.  A Critical Analysis of Proposed Solutions 
Although each of the proposals discussed in Part III.A has its merits, this 
Note contends that there is room for improvement.  Part III.B analyzes each 
of the proposals discussed in Part III.A in light of important societal 
interests.  As noted above,234 these interests include the need for better 
notice to regulated entities,235 the FTC’s goal of robust consumer 
protection,236 and the FTC’s need for administrative flexibility given the 
ever-evolving technological environment that it is regulating.237 
1.  The Ad Hoc Approach 
Advocates of the ad hoc approach, such as the FTC itself along with 
Solove and Hartzog, believe that the FTC’s current strategy, which focuses 
on enforcement and relies upon published complaints, consent orders, and 
online guidance to provide notice, adequately informs companies of the 
FTC’s minimum data security requirements.238  This Note argues that, at 
 
 226. See id. at 850. 
 227. See id. at 851–52. 
 228. See id. at 851. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. at 852. 
 231. See id. at 854. 
 232. See id. at 812–13. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 235. See, e.g., Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 6, at 706–07. 
 236. See What We Do, supra note 20. 
 237. See Serwin, supra note 21, at 852. 
 238. See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text. 
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least as to consumer protection and notice to regulated companies, this 
approach falls short. 
The ad hoc approach does provide the FTC with a great deal of 
administrative flexibility.  As it can opt to promulgate policy via 
adjudication,239 this approach enables the FTC to pick and choose which 
data security breaches to enforce.  Thus, through enforcement, the FTC can 
continue to bring actions against companies that it deems to have engaged 
in “unfair” data security practices.240 
As to consumer protection, the ad hoc approach provides robust ex post 
protection.  In other words, after a security breach occurs, the FTC will 
bring an enforcement action against a company if it believes the company 
employed “unfair” data security practices.241  While this strategy may well 
vindicate certain consumers’ injuries, it ignores robust ex ante protection, 
which would serve to protect consumers before a data security breach 
occurs by ensuring that companies have the proper incentives to employ 
data security best practices.242  The benefit of ex ante protection is that it 
helps to prevent the very breaches that the FTC enforces. 
This approach also fails to provide adequate notice to companies of 
which practices the FTC considers “unfair.”  The FTC’s complaints and 
consent orders merely list data security practices that, “taken together,” add 
up to unfair practices.243  While the FTC’s online guidance is a step in the 
right direction,244 it lacks the specifics necessary to ensure that companies 
know exactly what they need to do to avoid liability under the FTC’s 
unfairness authority. 
These shortcomings are illustrated well by the case against Wyndham.245  
If Wyndham had been provided ex ante notice of which data security 
practices it needed to implement to comply with FTC standards, it could 
have ensured that it had proper data security measures in place to better 
protect consumer information.246 
Solove and Hartzog contend that the FTC’s complaints and consent 
orders provide a great deal of standards, which illustrate that the FTC, as a 
baseline, requires companies to employ “adequate data security 
[practices].”247  However, this baseline still forces companies to ask, 
“Which of the practices required of the respondent company in any given 
enforcement action are required of my company?” 
 
 239. See supra notes 51, 68, 155. 
 240. See supra Part II.B (discussing the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority in the data 
security context). 
 241. See supra Part II.B. 
 242. See supra notes 219, 228 and accompanying text. 
 243. See, e.g., supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra note 158 (providing examples of such guidance). 
 245. See supra notes 140–50 and accompanying text. 
 246. See infra Part IV.A. 
 247. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 7, at 661–62; see also supra notes 165–71 and 
accompanying text. 
2016] FTC’s UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY AND DATA SECURITY 2253 
2.  The Legislative Fix 
Professor Scott argues that Congress must enact a statute to enable the 
FTC to police data security breaches under section 5.248  This Note takes 
the view that this proposal fails to provide sufficient administrative 
flexibility. 
First, Scott’s proposal would resolve the current lack of notice to 
companies regarding the FTC’s minimum data security requirements.  His 
proposed statute would require the FTC to engage in legislative rulemaking 
with respect to data security requirements under section 5.249  This 
requirement would ensure that companies would receive improved notice, 
through both the notice-and-comment period and the promulgation of any 
final rule,250 of which data security practices the FTC deems “unfair.” 
Relatedly, this proposal would have the benefit of providing for ex ante 
and ex post consumer protection.  Any rules promulgated pursuant to 
Scott’s proposed statute would give regulated companies a better 
understanding of which practices the FTC considers unfair.251  Thus, they 
would be able to employ these practices and better protect consumer 
information before a breach occurs.252  Moreover, Scott’s statute would 
provide enforcement authority under section 5,253 so those companies that 
fail to follow the FTC’s requirements would be held accountable as they are 
today.254 
Although Scott’s proposal maximizes consumer protection and notice to 
companies, it does not ensure sufficient administrative flexibility.  His 
proposed statute would require the FTC to issue any legislative rules by 
following the procedures set forth in the APA.255  While this process would 
evade the added procedural obstacles in place under section 5,256 it would 
make any promulgated final rules difficult to amend and adjust in light of 
changing technology.  Moreover, actually getting any proposed rules 
through the notice-and-comment period required under the APA would be 
quite expensive for the FTC in terms of time and money.  Given these 
onerous obstacles, this proposal would make it rather difficult for the FTC 
to give companies like Wyndham robust notice of its data security 
requirements. 
 
 248. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 249. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra Part II.B (explaining how the FTC brings its unfairness authority to bear 
upon companies that suffer data security breaches). 
 255. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (outlining the procedural requirements 
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3.  The Administrative Fix 
In contrast to Professor Scott, Stegmaier and Bartnick argue that the FTC 
should use its administrative authority under section 5 to provide better 
notice of its minimum data security requirements.257  This Note contends 
that, to the extent that the proposal would require that the FTC engage in 
legislative rulemaking, it likely would not provide for adequate 
administrative flexibility. 
Stegmaier and Bartnick’s proposal would afford regulated companies 
improved notice as against the FTC’s current practice.258  They maintain 
that the FTC should, preferably, engage in legislative rulemaking to set out 
its data security requirements.259  However, they also note that 
nonlegislative rulemaking (e.g., issuing policy statements or interpretive 
rules) would be better than nothing.260  In either case, any promulgated rule 
would have the benefit of providing notice to companies as to which data 
security practices the FTC considers “unfair.”261 
Additionally, Stegmaier and Bartnick’s proposal would lead to 
significantly improved consumer protection.  Ex ante, their proposal would 
provide guidance to companies via promulgated rules.262  In turn, these 
companies could employ data security best practices to ensure the data 
security breaches are less likely to occur.263  Ex post, section 5 enforcement 
would remain in place to enable the FTC to hold companies who failed to 
implement required data security practices accountable.264 
Despite these benefits, Stegmaier and Bartnick’s proposal may not 
provide the FTC with adequate administrative flexibility.  The authors 
explicitly prefer legislative rulemaking, as that process would provide 
additional notice to companies via notice and comment and the required 
informal hearing procedure.265  However, putting aside difficulties in 
getting any proposed rule through the hearing and notice-and-comment 
procedures,266 such a process would make it rather difficult to amend any 
rule regarding data security practices.  Such flexibility is invaluable in light 
of the dynamic technological environment in which data security 
enforcement takes place.267  Indeed, under this proposal, the FTC would 
have to adopt a new legislative rule every time it needed to adjust its data 
 
 257. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 258. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
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 262. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
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security requirements to give appropriate ex ante guidance to companies 
such as Wyndham.  This would be a significant burden for the FTC. 
4.  A Proposal for a New Privacy Framework 
Lastly, this Note addresses Serwin’s proposal for a new privacy 
framework in which the FTC would administer a regime based upon 
proportionality that provides a safe harbor from enforcement for compliant 
companies.268  Although this approach would likely do the most to 
maximize consumer protection and notice to companies, it may not ensure 
sufficient administrative flexibility. 
Like the legislative and administrative approaches,269 Serwin’s proposal 
would provide improved notice to companies.  Be it via legislation or 
rulemaking, this proposal would ensure that regulated companies know the 
FTC’s data security requirements.270  Moreover, Serwin’s four-tiered 
approach has the added benefit of providing nuanced guidance as to how 
companies can protect consumer information based on its relative 
sensitivity.271 
This improved notice would serve to promote consumer protection as 
well.  First, Serwin’s proposal incentivizes companies to adopt data security 
best practices as outlined by the FTC because, in so doing, they avoid 
liability under section 5.272  Thus, from an ex ante perspective, companies 
would be better able to prevent data security breaches from occurring.273  
Furthermore, this proposal enables the FTC to engage in ex post 
enforcement by bringing actions against those companies that fail to adopt 
data security best practices.274 
With respect to administrative flexibility, however, Serwin’s proposal 
would seem to come up short.  In his article, Serwin expresses ambivalence 
about implementing his proposal via legislation or rulemaking.275  Either 
process, however, could undercut flexibility.  Rulemaking would place 
procedural obstacles before the FTC because any amendments to rules 
promulgated under Serwin’s proposal would need to go through notice and 
comment and section 5’s onerous procedural requirements.276  Moreover, 
any legislation would prove to be exceedingly inflexible because the FTC 
would need to rely on Congress to amend a statute to provide it with the 
flexibility to address new and evolving data security threats. 
Serwin argues that his approach is flexible because it would enable the 
FTC to move a given type of consumer information to a different tier in his 
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four-tiered framework.277  While this may well be true, Serwin seems to 
ignore the fact that implementation via legislation or rulemaking would 
require any changes to be implemented via the same onerous processes.  
Thus, as is the case with the other proposals, the FTC could not provide 
companies like Wyndham with adequate notice of its data security 
requirements without dealing with significant procedural hurdles. 
IV.  TOWARD A REASONABLE REGIME:  
A NEW PROPOSAL REGARDING THE FTC’S CURRENT APPLICATION 
OF ITS UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY IN THE DATA SECURITY CONTEXT 
As Part III.B demonstrates, current proposals regarding the FTC’s use of 
its unfairness authority in the data security context fail to maximize 
consumer protection, administrative flexibility, and notice to regulated 
companies.  Accordingly, in an effort to maximize each of these important 
societal interests, Part IV.A of this Note proposes a new solution to the lack 
of clarity in the FTC’s data security jurisprudence and discusses its benefits 
and an identified drawback.  Then, Part IV.B considers a potential 
drawback to this Note’s novel proposal. 
A.  A New Proposal Incorporating the Principle of Proportionality 
In terms of implementation, the FTC should issue the following proposal 
by means of nonlegislative rulemaking.278  As outlined above, this form of 
rulemaking could take the form of an interpretive rule or a policy 
statement.279  An interpretive rule could outline how the FTC interprets 
section 5 with respect to unfair data security practices.280  Alternatively, a 
policy statement could notify regulated companies and the public generally 
of the manner in which the FTC will exercise its unfairness authority in the 
data security context moving forward.281 
Delineating the exact data security practices that the FTC should outline 
in any nonlegislative rulemaking is beyond the scope of this Note.  
However, Solove and Hartzog’s article seems to provide a sufficient 
starting point.  Upon analyzing “the FTC’s data security jurisprudence,” the 
authors compiled a list of what they term “inadequate security practices.”282  
For instance, Solove and Hartzog note that, in publically available 
complaints and consent orders, the FTC appears to deem such things as 
“[l]ack of encryption,” “[f]ail[ing] to test the security of a . . . process,” 
“[f]ail[ing] to remedy known security vulnerabilities,” “[f]ail[ing] to 
implement . . . common industry security practices,” and “[the use of] 
[p]oor username/password protocol” to be unfair data security practices per 
se.283  Accordingly, the FTC should draw from Solove and Hartzog’s work 
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and look to its own complaints and consent orders284 to determine which 
data security practices it considers “unfair.” 
The FTC should not stop there.  As Serwin’s article indicates, not all 
consumer information should be subject to the same data security 
requirements.285  Some companies possess rather sensitive personal 
information (e.g., Social Security numbers and fingerprint data), while 
others have more mundane information (e.g., usernames and email 
addresses).  Thus, any nonlegislative rulemaking should incorporate the 
principle of “proportionality.”286  Drawing from Serwin, the FTC should 
determine where a given type of consumer information falls on the 
spectrum between “nonsensitive” and “highly sensitive.”287  For example, 
the FTC could itemize types of consumer data under categories, such as 
Schedules I through IV, where Schedule I includes the least sensitive 
consumer information, while Schedules II, III, and IV include increasingly 
more sensitive information.  The FTC then could ratchet up the minimum 
data security requirements for those companies with more sensitive 
consumer information.288  To be most effective, any nonlegislative 
rulemaking should also lay out what minimum data security practices 
correspond with each schedule (i.e., “tier”) of consumer information.289  
Under such a regime, companies will know, based on the types of consumer 
information that they retain, which data security practices they ought to 
have in place. 
Lastly, as Serwin has proposed, the FTC should include a safe harbor 
provision in its nonlegislative rulemaking promulgated pursuant to this 
Note’s proposal.290  Such a provision would state explicitly that any 
company that complies with the data security requirements as laid out in the 
interpretive rule or policy statement would be deemed to have acted “fairly” 
for the purposes of section 5.291  Accordingly, a regulated company would 
know, ex ante, whether its data security practices are in compliance with 
section 5.292 
This Note’s proposal would serve to maximize notice to companies, 
consumer protection, and administrative flexibility.  First, it would improve 
notice to companies.  By outlining, as specifically as possible, which data 
security requirements correspond with specific types of consumer 
information,293 a company would know what the FTC requires of it in terms 
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of data security.  While nonlegislative rulemaking would not provide 
companies with the same notice and opportunity to be heard that a notice-
and-comment procedure would afford,294 the FTC can and should solicit 
industry input when promulgating nonlegislative rulemaking under this 
Note’s proposal.295 
Next, this proposal would maximize the FTC’s overarching goal of 
robust consumer protection.  From an ex ante perspective, improved notice 
via nonlegislative rules would better enable companies to protect consumers 
before a data security breach occurs by helping them to prevent breaches in 
the first instance.296  Moreover, this proposal affords the added benefit of 
providing nuanced guidance to companies based on the relative sensitivity 
of the consumer information that they retain.297  Ex post, the FTC could 
continue to bring enforcement actions under section 5 against companies 
that fail to meet the FTC’s minimum data security requirements298 because 
such companies could not take advantage of the proposal’s safe harbor 
provision.299 
Finally, this Note’s proposal, as against the proposals discussed above,300 
would provide the FTC with maximal administrative flexibility.  Legislative 
rulemaking and congressional legislation involve many procedural 
obstacles, and they can be quite expensive in terms of time and money.301  
Moreover, promulgating policy through administrative adjudication 
provides little guidance ex ante.302  Conversely, nonlegislative rulemaking 
would enable the FTC to promulgate policy ex ante, thereby providing 
improved guidance to regulated companies.303  Additionally, whenever the 
FTC would need to change its data security policy in light of evolving 
technology, it would have the ability to amend any existing data security 
policy by issuing a new interpretive rule or policy statement.304 
In sum, the proposal outlined in this Note, which encourages the FTC to 
outline minimum data security requirements that reflect the principle of 
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proportionality via nonlegislative rulemaking,305 would maximize the 
FTC’s interests in providing robust consumer protection while retaining 
administrative flexibility.306  In addition, the proposal goes further by 
ensuring that regulated companies receive ex ante guidance as to the FTC’s 
minimum data security requirements.307 
B.  Possible Concerns Regarding Judicial Deference 
In closing, Part IV.B of this Note considers one potential drawback to the 
novel proposal laid out in Part IV.A:  the possibility of decreased judicial 
deference.  Absent a congressional mandate to the contrary, courts typically 
give significant deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it 
administers.308  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has added the caveat that 
an agency interpretation is only entitled to significant deference “when it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”309  
Consequently, the nonlegislative rulemaking that this Note proposes likely 
would receive considerably less judicial deference as against legislative 
rulemaking. 
Notably, decreased judicial deference could put the FTC at a 
disadvantage if the application of its unfairness authority pursuant to this 
Note’s proposal were challenged in court.  However, the Supreme Court has 
also held that, given the experience and expertise of agencies like the FTC, 
even nonlegislative rules can garner at least some judicial deference.310  
Moreover, a reduction in judicial deference does not suggest that a given 
agency action is any less lawful.  Thus, notwithstanding any reduced 
judicial deference, the FTC should not hesitate to adopt the proposal set 
forth in Part IV.A of this Note. 
CONCLUSION 
In an age where companies increasingly acquire and retain private 
consumer information, data security breaches are a constant threat.  These 
breaches compromise personal information which consumers would prefer 
to keep private and can lead to identity theft.  To combat this trend, the FTC 
has stepped in to prevent data security breaches by holding victimized 
companies accountable when their data security practices are considered 
inadequate.  Specifically, the FTC increasingly has relied on its unfairness 
authority under section 5 of the FTC Act to bring enforcement actions 
against those companies that have not implemented “reasonable” data 
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security procedures.  The FTC has not, however, provided specific guidance 
regarding which practices it deems “unreasonable.” 
Although legal scholars have offered various solutions to address this 
lack of guidance, this Note argues that they fall short.  Thus, this Note 
proposes a new approach.  Rather than relying upon administrative 
adjudication, legislation, or legislative rulemaking, the FTC should engage 
in nonlegislative rulemaking to inform companies of its minimum data 
security requirements under section 5.  Such rulemaking, whether in the 
form of an interpretive rule or policy statement, should lay out mandatory 
data security practices that are proportional to the consumer information 
that a given company retains.  Furthermore, any interpretive rule or policy 
statement should include a safe harbor provision to ensure compliant 
companies that their data security practices will not be deemed “unfair.”  
FTC implementation of this Note’s proposal would ensure that:  (1)  
companies are put on notice regarding the FTC’s minimum data security 
requirements; (2)  the FTC can continue to pursue its goal of robust 
consumer protection; and (3)  the FTC will have maximum administrative 
flexibility in light of the ever-evolving technological environment that it 
regulates. 
